This paper examines the impact of soft dollar practices on market equilibrium and trading profits. The setting is one in which there exist both money managers and individual (nonclient) investors and in which soft dollar payments from brokers to money managers cannot be publicly observed. In this context it is shown that soft dollars increase the trading aggressiveness of money managers and decrease the aggressiveness of nonclient investors. Under certain conditions, the increased trading aggressiveness of the managers leads to an increase in their clients' expected profits, but to a decline in market liquidity and total trading volume. These results hold whether or not the clients adjust the money managers' fee for the expected soft dollar payments. However, if the actual amount of soft dollars paid were observable, their value to the client may disappear. The results of this paper should be of interest to the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is currently considering expanding the reporting requirements for soft dollars.
INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the impact of soft dollars on market prices, trading decisions, and investor profits. While the subject of soft dollars has not received much attention in the academic literature-to-date, it has been an ongoing topic of discussion at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC's interest stems partly from the sheer magnitude of soft dollars and partly from the potential for abusing existing arrangements. According to a survey by Greenwich Associates, soft dollar payments totaled almost $1 billion in 1996 and were made by 90% of the surveyed institutions. A recent article in Business Week quotes Craig Tyle, general counsel at the mutual fund trade group, Investment Company Institute, as saying that "My guess is everybody uses soft dollars to some extent. It's hard to be 100% free from it." 1 Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal (1998) report that soft dollar trades add approximately 17% to the cost of a representative transaction.
The term 'soft dollars' refers to the non-execution services (as well as the direct payments) that are provided by brokerage houses to large institutional clients in exchange for directed trades.
They owe their origin to the fixed minimum commission system which prevailed on the New York Stock Exchange until 1975. 2 Because brokers were not allowed to compete on price, they offered non-price concessions, principally in-house investment research, in an effort to attract the trading (and commissions) of large institutions. Once commissions were deregulated, their levels declined considerably; however, the charges for trade execution and for some non-execution services (such as research) often remained bundled. This meant a continuation of the practice of soft dollar payments.
Under a soft-dollar arrangement, a brokerage firm can rebate to an institutional client part of the the soft dollars received. 7 The SEC has been considering a requirement that institutions more precisely list the benefits they receive from soft dollars and is intending to clarify the items which would be inappropriate for soft-dollar exchanges. 8 The setting of our analysis is one in which soft dollar payments are not publicly observable.
There are assumed to be two types of active investors in the marketplace, those entrusting their funds to money managers, who, in turn, trade through a full-service broker (these investors are referred to as the clients), and those trading through a discount broker (referred to as the nonclients). The fullservice broker charges more in commissions than does the discount broker, and rebates some of that difference in the form of soft dollar payments to the money managers. Under this arrangement, money managers receive private investment information from the broker that is superior to the nonclients' information.
In this setting soft dollar payments from the broker to a money manager will motivate the manager to trade more aggressively than he otherwise would. Without nonclients in the marketplace, this would intensify the competition among money managers and, consequently, lower the trading profits each generates on behalf of his clients. However, when both money managers and nonclients trade in the market, the clients' trading profits may actually rise in the presence of soft dollar payments. This is because the money manager's aggressive trading causes a reduction in the demand of the nonclients. Whether or not profits do rise is shown to depend on the number of money managers in the market and on the precision of the private information of the nonclients.
Further analysis finds that soft dollar practices always work to improve price efficiency. However, market depth and total trading volume may decrease with these payments. 6 See SEC (1998). 7 Livingston and O'Neal (1996) provide evidence that mutual fund managers do not reduce their management fees for the soft dollar payments they receive for research.
If the soft dollars received by the managers become observable to their clients (as would be the case if the SEC requires detailed disclosure of soft dollar payments), the clients would want to offset these payments by a reduction in the fee paid to the money manager. This would eliminate the manager's incentive to trade more aggressively and could, in turn, reduce the clients' profits and increase the profits of other traders in the marketplace. Consequently, unless the clients can precommit to ignore the actual soft dollar payments in determining the money manager's fee, the SEC's additional disclosure requirements may have unintended negative consequences on commission-paying clients and unexpected wealth redistribution effects across investors.
These findings provide some insights into the costs and benefits of soft dollar practices both at the individual investor and market-wide levels. This analysis contributes to the growing body of literature on the costs of trading securities by examining some of the trade-offs that have not been considered in prior studies.
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The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section I the economic model is described.
Equilibrium is then derived for a market without nonclient investors in Section II. The equilibrium with both client and nonclient investors is presented in Section III, while the impact of soft dollars on clients' profits is examined in Section IV. Further analysis and extensions are presented in Section V, while the effect of mandating the disclosure of soft dollar payments is discussed in Section VI. A summary and conclusions section ends the paper.
I. THE MODEL
Consider a one-period securities market with a risky and a risk-free asset available for investment. Without loss of generality the risk-free rate is set equal to zero. The risky firm's end- 8 See SEC (1995) and SEC (1998) . 9 See Keim and Madhavan (1998) for a review of the literature documenting the magnitude and nature of implicit of-period value, denoted by v, is normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of 1/a (that is, a precision of a). In this market there are three types of investors. The first type place their funds with money managers who make the investment decisions. These investors will be referred to as clients. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that each manager takes on only one client. The second type of investor, referred to as the nonclients, make their own investment decisions. The third type are the liquidity traders, who buy or sell shares in the risky asset for reasons exogenous to the model.
All traders place their orders through brokers, either full service or discount, who, in turn, submit their orders to a market maker. A discount broker provides only execution services, while a full service broker also provides non-execution services, such as research. The commission of the discount broker consists solely of a fee for trade execution, which is normalized to equal zero. The commission of the full-service broker also includes a fee to cover non-execution services, from which the soft dollar rebate will come. This fee will be described in more detail shortly.
Each of the M money managers is assumed to use a full-service broker. At the beginning of the period, date 0, these brokers provide research to the money managers, allowing them to learn perfectly the risky firm's end-of-period value. Subsequently, at date 1 each money manager places an order for x m shares of the firm. The N nonclients are assumed to collect their own noisy private information about the risky firm's value and trade with a discount broker. Their date 0 information consists of a signal, z, where:
The noise term, ε, is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1/e, and is independent 5 and explicit trading costs.
of v. The ratio e/(a + e) will be denoted by g in the analysis below. 10 At date 1 each of the nonclients places an order for x n shares. The liquidity traders are also assumed to use a discount broker. At date 1 they submit orders for x u shares, where x u is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1/u, and is independent of both v and ε. Figure 1 graphically depicts the link between investor and broker types.
Our assumption that the money managers' private information is more precise than that of the nonclients is consistent with the recent work of Daniel et al. (1997) who show that mutual funds (one specific type of money manager) generate positive and significant gross risk-adjusted returns, and Barber and Odean (2000) who find, in contrast, that investors at a large discount brokerage house (the nonclients in our setting) earn gross risk-adjusted returns that are generally negative. It is also consistent with the superior returns found to be generated by the recommendations of security analysts, who are the source of much of the research used by money managers. (In many instances, money managers receive, and are able to trade on, the information before it is made public. In contrast, nonclients are unlikely to obtain the research before its publication.) Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996) , in particular, show that favorable (unfavorable) changes in sell-side analysts' stock recommendations are accompanied by positive (negative) returns at the time of their announcement.
Additionally, Dimson and Marsh (1984) , in a study of the unpublished stock return forecasts supplied by brokers and internal analysts to a large UK investment institution, find a significant correlation between forecasted and realized returns. In an implicit reference to soft dollars, they conclude that "These benefits are not, of course, freely available to all; they may be available only to 6 10 The ratio g reflects the weight a nonclient places on his private signal in the estimation of v. As g approaches 1 (that is, as the precision of the error term, e, approaches infinity), the precision of the nonclients' information approaches that of the money managers. As g approaches 0, the nonclients' information approaches pure noise.
the largest institutions in exchange for acceptable volumes of fixed-commission business".
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Summing the demands of each of the market participants, the date 1 total order flow, y, is given by:
There exists a risk-neutral and perfectly competitive market maker who sets the market price, P, at which she will absorb this order flow (as in Kyle (1985) ). The price set is equal to E(v|y), the expectation of v conditional on her information, y. At date 2 the firm's liquidating value, v, is publicly revealed and investors share in the liquidating dividend.
There are many ways to introduce into this setting soft dollar payments from the full-service broker to the money manager. Perhaps the most straightforward is to assume that at the beginning of the period the manager pays a fee to the broker (taken out of the client's funds on deposit) for the investment research the broker will be providing. Based on this information, the manager then places his trade at date 1, and pays the broker's commission. Subsequently, the broker rebates some portion of this commission to the manager. This rebate is not observable to the client. Regardless of how soft dollars are explicitly modeled, though, the crucial feature for our analysis is that while the client (and not the manager) pays for the research and commissions, the manager receives the soft dollars without rebating them to the client. (Rebating these soft dollars to the client would eliminate any effect they could have on the money manager's trading strategy.)
The non-execution brokerage fee is assumed to be given by t(Px m ), where 0<t<1.
(Additional restrictions on t will be imposed later.) The parameter t will sometimes be referred to below as the soft dollar parameter. We model the brokerage fee in this manner as it allows us to retain tractability, while, at the same time, captures the notion that commissions are often based on the dollar value of trade. 12 It implies, though, that when price, P, and demand, x m , are of opposite signs, the commission is negative. By choosing appropriate values for the economy's parameters (in particular, g), however, the probability that P and x m will be of opposite signs can be made arbitrarily small (see Appendix A).
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In addition to soft dollar payments from the broker, the money manager receives from his client a fraction, b, of the trading profits generated, as well as a management fee. This characterization of the manager's compensation is consistent with a fulcrum performance fee which is allowed by the SEC and is of increasing use in the industry. 14 It is also consistent with the common practice of charging a fee proportional to total assets under control, as the maximization of trading profits serves to increase the asset base as well.
Although the client cannot observe the soft dollar payments from the broker to the manager, he can calculate its expected magnitude. For most of our analysis, we will assume that the client adjusts the management fee downward for any soft dollar payments the manager is expected to receive during the period. The expected payment is given by tE [E(P|v) x m ], where the outer expectation is taken over all v. Let F denote the management fee that the manager would receive if soft dollar payments were expected to be zero. Then, the actual fee he will receive is equal to F -
. This quantity will be denoted by R below.
The money manager is assumed to choose his share demand, x m , so as to maximize his information is more precise than that of the nonclients. 12 Keim and Madhavan (1998) find that commissions increase with share price. Specifically, they report that "commission fees averaged 4-5 cents a share for shares trading below $5 and increased with share price to as much as 15 cents a share in the 1991-1993 period." 13 The problem arising when P and x m are of opposite signs could be solved by setting the commission equal to t|Px m |. Doing so, however, would make the analysis intractable, as the manager's expected profits (as specified below) would no longer be normally distributed. 14 The use of performance-based fulcrum fees was first allowed by Congress in 1970 for advisory contracts relating to large investments. In August 1998 the SEC amended the rule (under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940) that concerns the use of such a fee. The amendments provide investment advisers greater flexibility in structuring expected profits, E m (π m ), as given by:
The first component of E m (π m ) is the expected soft dollar payment from the broker. The second term is the manager's share of his client's trading profits. The third component is the management fee.
The client's expected profits, E c (π c ), are given by:
where the outer expectation is taken over all v. The first term within this expectation is the client's share of the expected trading profits for a given v. The second term captures the non-execution fee paid by the client (equal to the soft dollar payment from the broker to the manager). Given the definition of R, the client's expected profits can be rewritten as:
As (5) makes clear, the client's expected profits are independent of the expected soft dollar payments. Finally, the expected profits of the nonclients, E n (π n ), are given by:
II. AN ECONOMY WITHOUT NONCLIENT INVESTORS
As a benchmark for our subsequent analysis, in this section we derive a linear equilibrium for a market without nonclient investors. This equilibrium is characterized by
where (i) x m maximizes expression (3) subject to the conjectures that the date 1 price is given by (8) 9 performance fee arrangements with "high net worth" clients. See Cuoco and Kaniel (1999) for evidence of increased use of performance-based fulcrum fees.
and (ii) the date 1 price is equal to E(v|y), where y is given by expression (2) and N is set equal to zero. In determining the price, the market maker conjectures that informed demand is given by (7).
The parameter β m reflects the aggressiveness with which the money manager trades on his private information. The parameter λ represents the inverse of market depth, and measures the impact of an incremental dollar of order flow on market price. The greater is the market depth, the less does demand affect price.
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium in this setting.
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Proposition 1
In a setting without nonclient investors, a linear market equilibrium exists at date 1, provided that t<b/(M + 1). In this equilibrium,
The effect of an increase in the soft dollar parameter, t, on trading aggressiveness and market depth is given in Observation 1, which follows immediately from differentiation of expressions (9) and (10).
Observation 1
Both the money manager's trading aggressiveness, β m , and market depth, 1/λ, are increasing in the soft dollar parameter, t, and decreasing in the manager's share of trading profits, b.
An increase in the soft dollar parameter, t, raises the aggressiveness with which each money manager trades for his client. This is intuitive, as the higher the t, the greater the manager's return to an additional dollar traded. If t were to become too large relative to the manager's share of trading profits, b (greater than b/(M +1)), however, the manager would prefer his trades to have a greater, rather than a lesser, impact on price, as this would increase his soft dollar payments more than it would decrease his share of the trading profits. The manager's trading aggressiveness would then no longer be an increasing function of his private information, and equilibrium would break down. An increase in b raises the relative weight the manager places on generating trading profits vis-à-vis soft dollar payments. This leads him to reduce his aggressiveness, toward the level implied by a strategy that maximizes trading profits. Note that when t=0, b has no effect on β m since it is always in the manager's best interest to maximize trading profits. An increase in trading aggressiveness, owing either to an increase in t or a decline in b, positively affects market depth (or, alternatively, reduces λ) since it means that a unit change in informed order flow will be associated with a smaller change in the manager's private information. This, in turn, implies that the market maker's expectation of firm value will be less sensitive to total order flow.
Since λ decreases with t, so do the clients' expected profits, in the absence of nonclients.
This makes intuitive sense, as an increase in the soft dollar parameter takes the money manager's trading strategy further away from the level that maximizes trading profits. To understand this result more technically, note that the sum of trading profits, over all market participants, is zero. Since the market maker is competitive, her trading profits are zero. Therefore, the trading profits generated by the money managers are equal to the trading loss of the liquidity traders. Their expected loss is equal to λ/u. (See Kyle (1985) .) The smaller is λ, or alternatively, the higher the market depth, the smaller is the expected loss of the liquidity traders and the expected trading profits generated by the money managers. Since the clients' expected profits are equal to a fixed proportion of the trading profits generated on their behalf by the managers, minus a constant (see expression (5)), their expected profits are also decreasing in the soft dollar parameter.
III. AN ECONOMY WITH NONCLIENT INVESTORS
Consider now an economy in which money managers trade alongside nonclients. As we will show, in the presence of a second type of informed trader it is possible for soft dollar payments to increase the clients' expected trading profits. A linear equilibrium in this economy is characterized 
where (i) x m maximizes expression (3) subject to the conjectures that x n is given by (12) and the date 1 price by (13), (ii) x n maximizes expression (6) subject to the conjectures that x m is given by (11) and the date 1 price by (13), and (iii) the date 1 price is equal to E(v|y), where y is given by expression (2).
With two sets of informed traders, the equilibrium analysis becomes quite complex. We simplify it by allowing the number of nonclients to approach infinity. This assumption is meant to capture the notion that the number of individual investors greatly exceeds the number of institutional traders in the marketplace. Under this assumption, Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium in this setting.
Proposition 2

In an economy with a finite number of client investors and an infinite number of nonclient investors, a linear equilibrium exists at date 1, under the condition that t<b/(M + 1). In equilibrium,
and
Proof: See Appendix B.
The effect of an increase in the soft dollar parameter, t, on trading aggressiveness is given in the following observation.
Observation 2
A money manager's trading aggressiveness, β m , is increasing in the soft dollar parameter, t, while the nonclients' aggregate trading aggressiveness, Nβ n , is decreasing in t.
Proof: The proof follows from straightforward differentiation of expressions (14) and (15).
As before, an increase in soft dollar payments raises the aggressiveness with which each money manager trades for his client. However, now there is an additional effect. As the aggressiveness of the managers increases, it is beneficial for the nonclients to scale back their own trading; consequently, Nβ n decreases with the soft dollar parameter, t. The nonclients take this action because they recognize that more of the managers' information is expected to be revealed by the order flow and incorporated into the stock price, thereby decreasing their own expected marginal trading profits (from a unit increase in their share demand). By essentially precommiting the managers to trade more aggressively than they otherwise would, the presence of soft dollar arrangements reduces the nonclients' participation in the market. 16 It can further be shown that the impact of an increase in the soft dollar parameter on the trading aggressiveness of both the money managers and the nonclients is magnified as the precision of the nonclients' information, g, increases. This is intuitive, as the higher is g, the more aggressively do nonclients trade and the greater the scope and advantage for the money managers to reduce the nonclients' demand.
IV. THE CLIENTS' EXPECTED PROFIT
In this section we turn to an analysis of the impact of soft dollar practices on the clients' expected profits. Recall that total informed expected trading profits are given by λ/u. It is straightforward to show that the nonclients' expected trading profits approach zero as N approaches infinity. This is because the more nonclients who enter the market, the closer do their expectations of the market price, E(P|z), and of firm value, E(v|z), become. In the limit they are equal, leaving the nonclients with zero expected profits. Therefore, the expected trading profits of the money managers become equal to the total informed expected trading profits, λ/u. This immediately implies that the clients' expected profits increase with λ, as in the setting without nonclients. 16 In other contexts Sabino (1993) and Fishman and Hagerty (1995) show that an analyst can capture more of the In contrast to that setting, however, as the soft dollar parameter increases, there are two, possibly countervailing, forces at work which affect λ and the clients' expected profits. To see this, note that u e n 2 a n m 2 a n m
As before, an increase in the money managers' trading aggressiveness has a negative impact on λ.
Now, though, the decrease in the nonclients' trading aggressiveness positively affects λ. This opens up the possibility that λ (and hence the clients' profits) can increase with the soft dollar parameter.
Intuitively, a decrease in the trading aggressiveness of the nonclients means that less of their private information is incorporated into the market price, allowing the managers (and clients) to profit more from their own private information.
The next observation provides a characterization of how λ varies with the soft dollar parameter, t.
Observation 3
The derivative of the market depth parameter, λ, with respect to the soft dollar parameter, t: 
if the derivative is positive at t=0.
total trading profits by disseminating his private information to a greater number of clients.
Proof:
The proof follows from the differentiation of (16).
As this observation makes clear, either λ monotonically decreases with the soft dollar parameter, t, or it increases with t at first, and then decreases (that is, it is unimodal in t and reaches an interior . This condition is satisfied when the number of money managers, M, is sufficiently small and/or when the precision of the nonclients' information, g, is sufficiently high. When M is small, the impact of an increase in soft dollar payments on the total trading aggressiveness of all money managers, and, therefore, the negative impact on λ and clients' expected profits, is relatively small. When g is large, the reduction in the nonclients' trading aggressiveness, and, therefore, the positive impact on λ and clients' expected profits, of an increase in soft dollar payments is relatively great. As t increases, however, the total trading aggressiveness of all money mangers eventually becomes so large as to overwhelm the positive effect on clients' expected profits of the reduction in the nonclients' participation in the market.
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The optimal value of the soft dollar parameter, 17 Numerical simulations indicate that, even when the number of nonclients is finite (but sufficiently large), the clients' expected profits behave in a way similar to that described here.
16 18 We repeated our analysis for a setting in which the nonclients are small, risk-averse price-takers. In this setting λ strictly decreases with t, so that the total expected profits of informed traders (money managers and nonclient investors) decrease with the level of soft dollar payments. As t and the managers' trading aggressiveness increase, though, the managers capture a greater share of total trading profits. For certain parameter values, this will more than offset the decline in total profits, so that the clients' trading profits will increase with t. In this setting, too, would, in those cases, reduce both the profits of the money managers and those of their clients. As we argue later, merely allowing clients to observe the level of soft dollar payments can have the same effect.
V. FURTHER ANALYSIS AND EXTENSIONS
The first part of this section augments the previous analysis by examining the impact of soft dollar practices on price efficiency and trading volume. This analysis yields useful insights, as regulators, exchange officials, and academics are interested in understanding how potential regulation could affect these important features of capital markets. 
Observation 4 follows from straightforward differentiation of (19).
Observation 4
The efficiency of the equilibrium price increases with the soft dollar parameter, t.
As the soft dollar parameter increases, nonclients trade less aggressively, adversely affecting the amount of information conveyed by price. Counterbalancing this, the money managers trade more aggressively, positively impacting price efficiency. It can be shown that, as long as the money managers' information is not inferior to that of the nonclients, the net effect will be an increase in the amount of information reflected in price.
The effect of an increase in the soft dollar parameter, t, on informed trading volume, in contrast, is not unambiguous. The level of informed trading volume is given by
Expected informed trading volume is then
Differentiation of (20) with respect to the soft dollar parameter yields the following observation (pictorially represented in Figures 3a and b) .
Observation 5
Expected trading volume increases with the soft dollar parameter, t, provided that M 2 a 2 >e(a+e).
Otherwise, expected trading volume is unimodal in t, decreasing at first and then increasing.
When the number of money managers is sufficiently small and/or the precision of the signal observed by nonclients, e, is sufficiently high, expected informed trading volume may actually decline as the soft dollar parameter, t, increases. In such a case, the aggregate number of shares traded by nonclients falls by more than the number of shares traded by managers increases. Recall that Observation 3 presented a condition for soft dollars to negatively affect market depth that is similar in nature to that of Observation 5. This implies that in the presence of soft dollars, a decline in market liquidity is likely to be associated with lower trading volume.
We next consider the impact of relaxing the assumption that the money managers' private information is more precise than that of the nonclients. 19 For this analysis, it is necessary to also assume that the number of nonclients, N, is finite. Otherwise, their information would be fully incorporated into the market price, rendering the money managers' information worthless. 20 The first setting analyzed is one in which both the money managers and nonclients have perfect information. As in the case where the nonclients' information is noisy, the managers' (nonclients') trading aggressiveness increases (decreases) in the soft dollar parameter, t. In contrast to the previous setting, market depth (1/λ) unambiguously increases in t (see Figure 4a ). This implies that total informed expected trading profits decline in t as well. Unlike the prior analysis, though, this does not necessarily mean that the clients' expected trading profits decrease in the soft dollar parameter. This is because the money managers' increased trading aggressiveness enables them to capture a larger fraction of the expected trading profits (at the expense of the nonclients), which can more than offset the negative impact of the decline in total expected profits. In particular, when the number of money managers is sufficiently small, the clients' expected profits will initially increase in the soft dollar parameter and then decrease (see Figure 4b ).
The second setting analyzed is one in which the nonclients possess strictly more precise information than do the money managers; the nonclients' information is assumed to be perfect, while the money managers' information is noisy. As in the prior case, an increase in the soft dollar parameter results in an increase in the managers' trading aggressiveness as well as an increase in market liquidity. The effect on clients' expected trading profits is more difficult to assess, though, as the analysis becomes quite complex. Nevertheless, it is again true that when the number of money managers is sufficiently small, the clients' expected profits will initially increase in the soft dollar 19 Proofs of all results relating to extensions of the basic setting discussed below are provided in Appendix B.
parameter (see Figure 5 ).
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We now consider the impact of relaxing the assumption that the clients are able to adjust the money managers' fees to take into account the expected level of soft dollar payments. In order for clients to be able to adjust the managers' fee, the clients must know of the existence of these soft dollar arrangements, and must have some negotiating power with respect to these fees. That some clients may not be aware of soft dollar arrangements is suggested by the following quote from the SEC (1995):
"Soft dollar practices also diminish the ability of a client to evaluate the expense it incurs in obtaining portfolio management services and may hinder the ability of the client to negotiate fee arrangements, because the costs of soft dollar services are 'hidden' from investors in brokerage commissions."
Furthermore, Livingston and O'Neal (1996) provide evidence which indicates that, at least for mutual funds, managers do not reduce their fees to take into account the soft dollar payments made for research.
If the manager's fee is not adjusted for the expected level of soft dollar payments, then his expected profits will still be as stated in expression (3) and market equilibrium will again be given by Proposition 2. The client's expected profits will also be given, as before, by expression (4).
However, these expected profits no longer simplify to expression (5), as the management fee does not change with the soft dollar parameter, t. Instead, they become
An analysis of the effect of an increase in t on the client's profits becomes significantly more complex in this setting. It remains the case, though, that a sufficient condition for there to exist a level of soft dollar payments that will make the client better off is that ∂E c (π c )/∂t is positive at t=0.
(However, it is no longer clear that this is a necessary condition as well. 22 ) Evaluating ∂E c (π c )/∂t at t=0, this condition can be written as:
As before, this expression holds when the number of money managers, M, is small and the precision of the nonclients' information, as measured by g, is large enough. This means that even when the client does not adjust the management fee for any soft dollar payments received, the existence of soft dollars can increase his expected profits. Note that the manager's share of trading profits, b, must now be sufficiently small in order for expression (22) to be satisfied. For b very large, the client's residual stake in the trading profits generated by the money manager would be very small.
Consequently, the benefit the client gets from aggressive trading on the part of the manager would be swamped by the soft dollar payments the client must make to him, and the clients' expected profits would decrease with t. (This is illustrated in Figures 6a and b , where market depth is unimodal in the soft dollar payment, t, but the clients' expected profits are uniformly decreasing.)
VI. MANDATING THE DISCLOSURE OF SOFT DOLLAR PAYMENTS
This section considers the impact of the SEC's proposal to mandate the disclosure of soft dollar payments. If the clients observed these payments, then they could fully adjust the management fee for the actual (rather than the expected) soft dollars paid. If they did, then the fee would become F-tE(P|v)x m , implying that the manager's expected profits would reduce to
which is independent of the actual soft dollar payments. This arrangement is essentially one in information.
which all soft dollars received by the manager are rebated to his client. Note that this change would not impact the management fee paid by the client, on average, since the client had previously correctly calculated the level of expected soft dollar payments (and deducted that from the management fee). However, there would be an effect on the manager's trading decision. With soft dollar payments no longer having an impact on him, the manager's goal would be to maximize his share of the client's trading profits (which, as we have shown, may result in lower expected trading profits for the clients in equilibrium). This implies that simply by mandating the reporting of soft dollars, clients could be made worse off; from their perspective, the impact of a reporting requirement for soft dollars would be the same as that of an outright prohibition of these practices.
The SEC's requirement that soft dollar payments be disclosed would, therefore, have the unintended consequence of redistributing wealth across traders. 23 In our setting, any reduction in the clients' expected trading profits would accrue to the liquidity traders, in the form of a reduction in their expected trading loss. More generally, in a setting in which there are a finite, rather than an infinite, number of nonclients (implying that they earn positive trading profits), the reduction in the clients' expected profits would be split between the nonclients and liquidity traders. It is likely that the SEC, whose mission is to protect all investors, was not expecting its disclosure requirement to have redistributive effects across the different classes of traders, and did not intend for this to be the result of its action.
These conclusions are based on the assumption that each client does, in fact, adjust the manager's fee for the actual level of soft dollar payments received. It could be argued that the client would not make this change to the fee structure, continuing, instead, to employ a compensation 22 It was a necessary condition, though, in all numerical analyses conducted. 23 In addition, disclosure would necessitate better bookkeeping and internal control measures that are currently scheme which adjusts the manager's fee for the expected level of soft dollar payments, so as to replicate the impact of soft dollars. In such a case, the SEC's disclosure requirement would then have no effect on the market. This argument, however, requires that the client be able to make a credible commitment to the market to ignore the actual level of soft dollars. Without the ability to precommit, this equilibrium could not be sustained, as the client would have an incentive (and the necessary information) to enter into an undisclosed side-agreement with the manager to reduce his fee by the actual, rather than the expected, amount of soft dollar payments. This would not have any effect on the manager's expected fee, but would make the client better off. This is because the manager's objective function would become independent of soft dollar payments, and so would be equivalent to the maximization of expected trading profits; conditional on the trading aggressiveness of the nonclients, this is clearly in the client's best interests, ex-post. (Of course, the nonclients would correctly conjecture that such an undisclosed agreement has taken place and would not reduce their trading aggressiveness. As a result, the client may actually be made worse off ex-
ante.
24 ) It is the absence of a disclosure requirement which ensures that the client is not able to renegotiate his contract with the manager and, in turn, commits the manager to trading more aggressively than he otherwise would.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed the impact of soft dollar payments from brokers to money managers on market equilibrium and on the profits of the managers' clients. Attention has also been given to the effect on the clients' profits of increased disclosure requirements. It was shown that soft dollar almost nonexistent (see SEC (1998)). The managers' clients will most likely pay for these costly measures.
23 24 There are a wide range of settings within which the inability to precommit induces suboptimal behavior. One well-known example is discussed in Myers and Majluf (1984) . They show that a manager who cannot precommit to take on all positive net present value projects will forego profitable projects with positive probability.
payments increase the trading aggressiveness of the money managers and decrease the aggressiveness of the nonclient investors. Additionally, the clients' expected profits increase, as long as the number of money managers is not too great and the nonclients' information is sufficiently precise. The analysis assumed, for the most part, that clients are unable to perfectly observe the soft dollar payments made to the money managers. If these payments become observable (as proposed by the SEC), then the clients would be able to offset them by a reduction in the money managers' fee. In this sense, the requirement that soft dollar payments be reported is equivalent, from the clients' perspective, to an outright prohibition on their payment. This would eliminate the manager's incentive to trade more aggressively and could reduce the clients' expected profits. In addition, eliminating soft dollar practices will reduce price efficiency and, in certain cases, market liquidity. These are important points for the SEC to take into consideration when deliberating the disclosure rules for soft dollar payments.
Appendix A: Proof that the probability that P and x m are of different signs can be made arbitrarily small
The proof will follow in two steps. In the first step it will be shown that the probability that P and x m are of the same sign is positively related to the correlation coefficient between these two variables, denoted by ρ. In the second step, it will be proven that ρ monotonically increases (decreases) in e (a).
Step 1 The following proof is based on Grimmett and Stirzaker (1997) , p. 170. Denote the variance of x m by and the variance of the price by σ . The bivariate normal distribution function for these variables is given by 
Now, the probability that P and x m are of the same sign is equal to This expression is increasing in the correlation parameter for -1 < ρ < 1.
Step 2 For expositional simplicity, we will focus on the expression for ρ 2 . Now, (14) and (15) It is straightforward to show that this expression monotonically increases in e, but declines in a.
Proof of Proposition 2
The money manager's objective is to choose the number of shares, x m , which maximizes (3), given his conjectures of the price function and other traders' demand functions. This maximization problem is given by:
Taking into account that all money managers are identical, the first-order-condition yields the solution to x m , as a function of λ and β n :
Similarly, the nonclient's objective is to choose the number of shares, x n , that maximizes (6), given his conjectures of the price function and other traders' demand. This is given by:
Since all nonclients are also identical, the first-order-condition yields the solution to x n , as a function of λ and β m :
Solving (A.2) and (A.4) simultaneously yields
The market maker determines the depth parameter, λ, given her conjectures regarding informed investors' demand. Now, u e n a n m a n m
Simplifying (A.7) leads to the following relation:
Expression (16) in the text directly follows from (A.9). Also, for N → ∞, β m and Nβ n simplify to
Substituting for λ and simplifying yields (14)- (15) in the text.
Proofs of claims for the case where all informed investors have perfect information
In this case, the nonclients observe v with no noise. This implies that z=v and g=1. Setting g=1 in (A.5), (A.6), and (A.8) yields, respectively
(A.14)
For equilibrium to exist λ must be positive. This requires the numerator of (A.14) to be positive, as well as t to be less than b. 
It follows from straightforward differentiation of (A.14)-(A.16) that dλ/dt<0, dβ m /dt>0, and dβ n /dt<0. Now, a client's ex-ante expected profits, c π , are given as follows:
This further simplifies to Note that the sign of (A.18) is determined by the sign of the expression in curly brackets, which is quadratic (with a global minimum) in t. It is straightforward to show that this sign is negative for b=(M+1)t. Thus, for the client's profits to initially increase in t, and then decrease, it is necessary and sufficient that the intercept of this quadratic expression be positive. The condition for this is
given by ]
Proof of claims for the case where there is perfect (noisy) information available to nonclients (money managers)
In this case nonclients observe v whereas the money managers' information consists of a noisy signal, z, where:
As before, the ratio e/(a + e) will be denoted by g. The money manager's maximization problem is now given by: The nonclient's problem is given by:
The resulting two first-order conditions are simultaneously used to derive the following expressions for β m and β n : 
(A.24)
For equilibrium to exist, λ must be positive. This requires the expression within the curly brackets in the numerator of (A.24) (denoted by H, below) to be positive as well as t to be less than b. Note that H monotonically declines in t and that, at t=0, H>0. Also note that H<0 at t=b(M+1-Mg)/(M+1)<b, provided that g>0. Thus, there exist a unique value for t, denoted by t', for which equilibrium exists for all t<t'. Note that the range of values of t for which equilibrium exists may now exceed b/(M+1) (in contrast to the previous settings). When the manager has information inferior to that of nonclients, his trading aggressiveness is relatively small. Therefore, the threshold value of t at which the manager prefers soft dollars to trading profits (i.e., when trading aggressiveness is no longer a function of private information) must be higher.
From the monotonicity of H in t it follows that dβ m /dt>0, since the numerator (denominator) of β m is positively (negatively) related to t. Also, straightforward differentiation of (A.24) reveals that λ monotonically declines in t.
Now, a client's ex-ante expected profits, c π , are given as follows:
This further simplifies to: This implies that at t=0 the derivative will be positive, provided that M is sufficiently small.
Proof of claim for the case where clients do not adjust for the expected level of soft dollar payments (again assuming an infinite number of nonclients)
When the client does not adjust for the expected level of soft dollars payments, his ex-ante expected profit becomes:
(1 )(1 )( ( 1) M=4, N=6, b=0.05, u=1, a=1, g=1, and F=0. N=10, b=0.05, u=1, a=1, g=0.9 , and F=0. M=3, N→∞, b=0.25, u=1, a=1, g=0.9, and F=0. 
